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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

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STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2019
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KDEM](#) [EAID](#) [PINR](#) [MD](#)
SUBJECT: AMN LEADER URECHEAN BELIEVES LUPU WILL
BE ELECTED PRESIDENT

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a December 2 meeting, AMN leader Serafim Urechean told the Ambassador that he believed that Alliance candidate Lupu would be elected as President. He said that the process of cutting a deal was well underway, but still needed a few more days. Urechean suggested that a lot depended upon Communist Party leader Voronin's moods, but the latter had given several indications that the Communists might vote. Urechean was concerned about strains within the Alliance, but remained convinced that working together the four leaders could reach their political goals. Urechean was aware that Prime Minister Filat had approached AMN Deputy leader Untila proposing a "murky partnership" which would lead to eliminating Urechean as AMN party leader and the merging of the two parties. Urechean had chosen not to raise this with Filat now, as it was preferable that all four focus on getting Lupu elected as President. Urechean suggested that Filat needed assurances that he would retain his Prime Minister's seat if Lupu were elected. End Summary

Still Possible to Elect a President

¶2. (C) AMN leader Serafim Urechean opened his December 2 meeting with the Ambassador by noting that the road towards presidential elections was a roller coaster of positive and negative conflicting signals. Urechean was meeting with PCRM deputies and trying to convince them to vote. He found that many were saying "yes" but at the same time pointing "in fear" to the picture of Voronin on the wall.

¶3. (C) Urechean said that he believed that Lupu would be elected as President. He said that the information continued to be contradictory, with PCRM activities being so chaotic that it was difficult to understand what was the truth. Urechean noted that a lot depended upon Voronin's mercurial moods. During the December 1 PCRM Political Committee meeting, Voronin had been most categorical that the PCRM would not vote, but later that evening in another meeting, he had said that they would vote.

¶4. (C) Urechean said he believed PCRM MP Turcan (ringleader of a group of PCRM MPs backing Lupu) had as many as 15 PCRM MPs ready to join him in breaking from the Communist Party faction (Note: a day earlier Turcan had told us he only had 6-

8). Urechean suggested that one PCRM deputy in Turcan's camp was former PM Greceanii, with whom he enjoyed very good relations. Greceanii had been born in Siberia after her parents were exiled, he said, and his relatives had educated her and brought her up. Now, he said, Greceanii was in despair. She had said to Urechean that she was ready to switch sides if needed. Urechean said that Greceanii had already talked with Voronin about the group's intention to vote and suggested that they would have more information about Greceanii's level of commitment by the next day.

Concern about Strains within the Alliance

15. (C) Urechean said that the Alliance needed better coordination. He had been "astounded" and severely disappointed by the lack of Alliance unity displayed on the November 30 PRO-TV Talk Show when Alliance representatives had openly disagreed with Lupu's 12 Principles (Note: Lupu's proposal of promises to the PCRM if they voted for him). Urechean said he had suffered a sleepless night worrying about what happened, and expressed his concerns that some Alliance figures did not understand how much a public word could count politically. Urechean had tough discussions with the other Alliance leaders warning them they could lose popular support if such cracks in the Alliance are seen publically. Urechean had warned both Ghimpu and Filat not to talk about sensitive

issues of language and history.

16. (C) Urechean said that he personally had no problems with the other Alliance leaders, but that the main tension between Lupu and Filat was palpable. Urechean noted rumors that Filat was promoting the idea that Communists should not vote for Lupu. He said that he personally did not believe what was being said about Filat, but worried that where there was so much smoke, there might be some kind of a fire. Urechean noted that Filat had betrayed him in 2005 when he voted for Voronin then. Urechean confirmed that the Alliance would have a system of control over the voting in place on December 7, which would allow them to check each vote and know if any MPs betrayed Lupu.

17. (C) Urechean reported Filat's concern that if Lupu became President, he (Filat) could be dismissed from his position as Prime Minister. Urechean vowed that he would never vote for Filat's dismissal, but noted that if the Democratic Party voted together with the PCRM, they would have enough votes. (Comment: We note that this would not be possible, since there are several PD deputies who are close to Filat and would not go along with such a scenario.)

Filat Scheming in Scenario to Merge with AMN Party

18. (C) Urechean confided that Filat had approached AMN Deputy Untila, suggesting a "murky partnership." Filat had shown interest in the local structures of AMN. Urechean explained that AMN had local branches in all raions, and was the only party within the Alliance that had territorial branches throughout the country. Filat's PLDM did not have control over any local or raion councils, whereas AMN had 2,500 local-level officials including 220 village mayors, 7 town mayors, 14 raion chairmen and 7 deputy chairmen. Ghimpu's PL had a few such seats, PD a

handful, but PLDM had none.

¶9. (C) Urechean said he knew Filat had approached Untila offering a scenario to eliminate Urechean as head of the party. According to this plan, Untila would then merge the AMN party with Filat's PLDM. In the case of early elections, Filat would then have access to AMN's national structure, while the PLDM's voter popularity would guarantee Untila a seat in Parliament that AMN might otherwise fail to win. Urechean said that Iurie Kolesnic was also with Untila in this potential scheme. Urechean expressed some regret that Filat was poaching within his party, but said he had not raised the issue with him. Urechean said he was not concerned and that he felt strong enough not to need to say anything to Filat about it at this time.

Unity is Important for Reaching Political Goals

¶10. (C) Urechean's greatest concern was that if the Alliance was discredited, they would lose the chance for political change in Moldova. Despite the reports of disagreements and political scheming, Urechean remained convinced that working together was important. He said he had told his Alliance partners that it was important to be honest with each other. The four had an historic opportunity to enact positive change in Moldova. If the opportunity was lost, then nation would not forgive them.

¶11. (C) Urechean therefore believed it was important for the Alliance leaders to do everything possible to elect Lupu. Urechean suggested that the Alliance needed to give guarantees to Filat that he would not be dismissed from his Prime Ministerial seat if Lupu were elected President.

¶12. (C) Urechean said he realized that no party was strong enough to win an outright majority and thus Moldova would be run by a coalition for many years to come. If the four leaders were

discredited and the current coalition failed, a center-left coalition would come to power and the dynamic of reform and European Integration would be different. Urechean did not want to lose this chance to help lead Moldova in the direction of reform.

Comment

¶13. (C) Urechean displayed a quiet confidence that a President would be elected on December 7. Even in the face of evidence that one Alliance partner was threatening his party's interests, Urechean remained focused on the Alliance's key political goals of leading the country to reform and European integration. The priorities he articulated need to be at the core of the Alliance's vision, that the four leaders must remain united and work together in order to be successful.

CHAUDHRY